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COMMENTS
THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN LITIGATION
INVOLVING TECHNOLOGICALLY
COMPLEX TRADE SECRETS
JEROME DOYLE*
ALLEN S. JOSLYN **
Litigation, although never a happy recourse, is to be particularly
avoided when trade secrets are involved. Because the risks involved
transcend those of normal litigation, it is especially important that,
before the litigation has acquired a momentum of its own, counsel
educate the respective parties about precisely what is at stake. The
pitfalls of trade secret litigation are many, varied and unique, in that
both parties—the prospective plaintiff and defendant—are exposed and
are exposing themselves to possible irreparable business damage with
the institution of the lawsuit. Perhaps no other single facet of the
law calls for as much pre-litigation counselling, objective evaluation,
and thorough fact-finding. Just as a good lawyer advises nine out of
ten would-be libel plaintiffs against opening a Pandora's box by suing,
so here utmost caution is the theme.
Plaintiff's counsel will be chiefly concerned with the pitfalls in-
volved in the decision to sue; defendant's counsel may, however, per-
form his most valuable services when the time comes for settlement
suggestions. The purpose of this comment is to attempt to assist coun-
sel's educational efforts by providing an abbreviated guide to that
particular region of purgatory inhabited by businessmen who rashly
insist on bringing or fighting a trade secret case.'
We may begin with the prospective plaintiff who believes that an-
other is improperly using his trade secrets. Unless his counsel is alert,
such a prospective plaintiff may in fact frustrate his goal of secrecy by
bringing suit. In many cases there may be substantial doubt regarding
* A.B. Boston College, 1931; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1934; Member, New York
Bar; Partner, Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl, New York, New York.
** B,A. Haverford College, 1958; B.A. Oxford University, 1960; LL.B. Harvard
Law School, 1963; Member, New York Bar.
1 This comment will not attempt to explain the substantive principles of trade
secret law. For such a review, see Callman, Unfair Competition (1950); Ellis, Trade
Secret (1953) ; Turner, The Law of Trade Secrets (1962); Klein, The Technical Trade
Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 437 (1960); Developments in the Law,
Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 947-59 (1964). As its title suggests, this
comment will not deal with litigation involving misappropriation of general business
ideas, advertising schemes, etc., where continued secrecy is not an important consideration
and where any relief would he primarily in the form of damages.
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which processes the potential defendant uses and whether he obtained
them from the plaintiff. In such cases the greatest disadvantage of
bringing suit is that plaintiff will have to disclose his trade secrets to de-
fendant in the process of attempting to prove that defendant is using
them. 2 Although protective orders would be available to plaintiff to
protect his disclosures in the course of litigation, they may not offer
the degree of assurance plaintiff would like.
A court, in entering a protective order, is faced with a seemingly
unavoidable dilemma. If the order limits disclosure to the parties'
counsel, it may well be impossible for the lawyers properly to prepare
their cases, since they lack the technical background in the industry
necessary to compare the processes involved!' On the other hand, if a
party's trade secrets are revealed to his opponent's technical staff, it
may be virtually impossible to prevent their later use.
Disclosures made in the course of litigation will have independent
significance only in the event that plaintiff loses on his basic claim. 4 In
that event, plaintiff begins with one strike against him if he later
tries to hold defendant liable for violation of the protective order. If
defendant imposes a normal degree of industrial security, he may be
able to use plaintiff's secrets without plaintiff ever becoming aware
of it. Even assuming that plaintiff finds out about defendant's subse-
quent use, he will have difficulty proving that such use is due only
to the disclosure under the protective order; a court, moreover, is less
likely to foreclose defendant from use of a process because he may
have learned it in the course of being unsucessfully sued than if de-
fendant's use is traceable to the wrongdoing of an ex-employee of
plaintiff. In addition, defendant may, in the course of defending him-
self, discover a number of references in the literature or patents from
which plaintiff's process can be put together, and it may be difficult to
prove that the later use is necessarily due to plaintiff's disclosure rather
than to defendant's search of sources in the public domain. Alterna-
tively, defendant may have already been conducting preliminary re-
search along a number of lines, including the one that plaintiff had
perfected, and the knowledge of plaintiff's success may induce defend-
2 Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Joseph C. Wirthman Drug Co., 48 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1931).
Normally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff will have to do so before
he can utilize discovery procedures against defendant.
3
 It would always be possible to limit disclosure only to independent experts
retained for the litigation, Delaware Chems., Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 36 Del.
Ch. 126, 127 A.2d 465 (1956), but that might impose too great an expense upon the
parties even assuming that experts unconnected with any competitor can be found.
4
 If plaintiff proves that defendant had already misappropriated the secrets which
plaintiff disclosed in the course of showing such misappropriation, the injunction finally
entered will prohibit further use. It is only to the extent that the secrets disclosed in
litigation exceed those which defendant is found to have misappropriated that disclosure in
litigation is independently harmful.
744
TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
ant to continue the research be might otherwise have abandoned. In
short, the simple fact is that if plaintiff loses his lawsuit, he is going
to be in a poor position to complain later that defendant is using in-
formation disclosed in the litigation. This is especially true, of course,
if plaintiff loses because of a public domain defense.
In some cases, protection against subsequent claims of prior
discovery can be afforded by requiring each party, before disclosure
of the other's process, to file a detailed statement of the process he is
presently using.' This device might be extended to include processes
each is trying to develop. If anything more than a few fairly narrow
and clearly-defined processes are involved, however, such a device
would become unworkable; it would not, moreover, completely insure
against defendant's later concentration on one line of research, already
begun and disclosed in the statement, because of the knowledge gained
in the litigation that the process could be made workable.
Given such risks, it is more than normally important that counsel
for the potential plaintiff ascertain before suit is filed whether plain-
tiff has a good case.' To begin with, counsel may save his client con-
siderable embarrassment and expense by first making sure that pro-
tectible trade secrets are involved at all. It is a natural tendency to
exaggerate the importance of one's particular company and its busi-
ness, and, especially after a key employee has left to take a better-
paying job, 7 the client may be suffering from delusions of grandeur
concerning the uniqueness or value of his methods.' In addition to
providing an unemotional evaluation of the asserted "secrets" which
the vagrant employee knows, counsel may also wish to point out that
a court would be quite reluctant to prohibit the employee from working
for his new employer and from using the general skills be learned in
his prior employment' A realistic evaluation of the risks involved as
5 See Delaware Chems., Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 111 U.S. Pat. Q. 193 (Del,
Ch. 1956), evidently modified upon clarification of plaintiff's request, Delaware Chems.,
Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., supra note 3.
6 If a thorough factual investigation discloses that defendant has demonstrably
misappropriated plaintiff's trade secrets, it may not be necessary actually to file suit to
achieve substantially the benefits plaintiff might reasonably hope to achieve through
litigation, at least insofar as injunctive relief is concerned. It may be sufficient to
approach the prospective defendant with a well drafted complaint and the facts to
back it up.
7 The danger to the new employer arises primarily when he hires two, three, or
more key employees from a competitor, for then he is subject to a "raiding" charge.
8 As the court observed in Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L.
Abs. 17, 54, 105 N.E.2d 685, 709 (1952): "All of us have 'our method' of doing a
million things—our method of combing our hair, shining our shoes, mowing our lawn.
Labelling it 'my method' does not make it secret."
Absent an enforceable contract not to work for a competitor, a court will
generally refuse to enjoin an ex-employee from working for his new employer simply
because he knows the trade secrets of his former employer or because he has already
wrongfully disclosed those trade secrets. Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp.
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balanced against the benefits likely to be gained may often convince
the client to refrain from suing. Obviously, the lawyer must utilize
to the fullest degree the technical expertise of his client; he must
also, however, resist any attempt by the client to draw legal conclusions
from that technical expertise.
Defendant must, of course, be equally concerned with disclosure
of his trade secrets to plaintiff in the course of litigation. The pendency
of the lawsuit may, however, have other equally grave consequences.
In some situations, potential purchasers from defendant may be
frightened away by the possibility of a claim later being asserted
against them.' So also a projected merger or offering of securities may
be completely aborted by the pendency of the lawsuit.'
In short, in cases where both parties entertain some doubt as to
the strength of their respective positions, there is a strong incentive to
avoid reciprocal disclosure if possible. Moreover, the normal interest
of a defendant in delaying the lawsuit may not be present in trade
secret cases.
In this connection, the parties may find it advantageous to agree
to the use of court-appointed impartial experts in controlling the areas
of discovery. In one case,' 2
 with the consent of the parties, the court ap-
pointed two independent experts to inspect both parties' plants and
papers and to report which aspects of plaintiff's plants were substantially
similar to defendant's. The experts were also directed to identify those
516 (E.D. Mich. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Irving Iron Works v.
Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, 126 Atl. 291 (1924). Compare Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc. 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y. Supp. 325 0919).
On the other hand, if there is a clear threat of intentional disclosure of valuable trade
secrets by a former key employee who acquired all his knowledge of the area while with
his former employer, an injunction restraining him from working in that area for his
new employer may be appropriate. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohigemuth, 117 Ohio App.
493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963). Cf. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash &
Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964). Wohigernuth and American Polish may
portend even broader injunctive protection for the ex-employer, although the wisdom of
such protection is subject to question if it goes beyond cases of threatened intentional
disclosure.
141 This situation would occur if defendant is engaged in selling expensive produc-
tion facilities and/or providing know-how rather than simply producing consumption
goods.
11 Such an effect may, especially if defendant is small and plaintiff large in the
industry, lead to a counterclaim under the antitrust laws or the law of torts alleging
that suit was brought for an improper purpose. The likelihood of such a counterclaim
can, however, be considerably reduced if, prior to institution of suit, plaintiff obtains
an order that the complaint be sealed. The court has power to seal a complaint,
Birnbaum v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 17 F.R.D. 133 (N.D. Ill. 1953), and in one case, at
least, has done so on the request of plaintiff. Allied Chem. & Dye Co. v. Dixon Chem. &
Research, Inc., Civil No. 467-58, D.N.J., order dated April 24, 1958.
12 Ethyl Corp. v. Skaggs, Civil No. 9905, N.D. Ala., order dated October 27, 1961.
Cf. Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., supra note 9. Compare Delaware Chems., Inc. v.
Reichhold Chems., Inc., supra note 3.
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aspects which, although substantially similar, they considered to be in
the public domain and to set forth the basis for their opinion. On the
basis of such a report, the court could confine discovery to those aspects
found to be substantially similar, and, if no important areas of similarity
were found, the parties would be spared the considerable expense of
further litigation.
Of course, a confident defendant might agree simply to open his
files for plaintiff's inspection so that plaintiff could convince himself
that defendant was innocent. However, this course of action presents
considerable dangers. In the first place, defendant's top executives
who will make the decision may not really know what the files con-
tain." Secondly, plaintiff will be prone to believe that any similarities
are due to misappropriation of plaintiff's secrets, where an independent
expert might conclude that the similarities are simply due to the fact
that competent technicians designing facilities to achieve the same
results are likely to parallel each other to a degree. Finally, it is not
inconceivable that, in some situations, such disclosure would be re-
garded as violating the antitrust laws."
In many situations, defendant may be anxious to defer plaintiff's
discovery until plaintiff has defined the nature of his trade secrets,
particularly where plaintiff is an alleged inventor or a peddler of tech-
nological information claiming that he disclosed trade secrets to de-
fendant. If plaintiff is not forced to define his alleged disclosures
before he gets into defendant's files, he may simply claim whatever
he finds there. Even though a protective order limiting disclosure to
third parties would be available, it may also be appropriate to defer
discovery into defendant's secrets until plaintiff has defined the secrets
he expects to find in defendant's files; in most cases this would involve
deferring discovery until trial.''
33 It should also be remembered that it may be difficult to get objective advice
from one's technical staff who are being accused of intellectual theft. No technician or
scientist enjoys being accused of intellectual theft, even if unwittingly committed, and
the evaluation of the merits of plaintiff's claim which they give defendant's executives
often is, at least in part, an exercise in self-justification. An impartial report may,
however, induce defendant to look more favorably upon the possibility of settlement.
14 Thus the acquisition of "assets" covered by Section 7 of the Clayton Act may
include learning a competitor's trade secrets. See United States v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) ff 71193 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1964); consent
decree entered, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) V 71311 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1964).
15 See Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Remington
Rand, Inc. v. Control Instrument Co., 7 F.R.D. 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). Compare Grasselli
Chem. Co. v. National Aniline & Chem. Co., 282 Fed. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). This
approach is an application of the general reluctance of courts to order disclosure of
a party's trade secrets until it clearly appears that they are necessarily relevant. See
International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F,R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Cities
Service Oil Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 10 F.R.D. 458 (D. Del. 1950) ; Lever
Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1941). In any case,
it is generally advisable that plaintiff's alleged trade secrets be defined prior to trial
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The problem of the scope and nature of injunctive relief is one
which deserves particular examination by defendant's counsel. Of
course, if defendant is found guilty of misappropriation, the damages
may be severe, if not ruinous. It is, nevertheless, in the injunctive pro-
hibitions that the most serious long-term effect of the suit may be felt,
and the far-reaching form which such relief may take distinguishes
trade secret litigation from the more usual type of lawsuit. The in-
genuity of defendant's counsel may play an important role in shaping
an injunction which is possible to live with.
Unfortunately, once defendant has been found guilty of improper
conduct, many courts tend to enter sweeping and vague injunctions
without giving very much thought to their terms 1 8 It is probably ad-
visable in most trade secret cases to employ a procedure of ten used
in civil antitrust suits, i.e., holding a separate hearing on relief after
the court has made its findings of fact and liability." Trade secret
cases may, after all, rival antitrust suits in factual complexity and the
impact of the decree on defendant's business, and in both types of
litigation it may be exceedingly difficult for counsel adequately to
argue the issues of relief until they know the scope of liability. Al-
though other courts have scheduled separate hearings on relief after
rendering their findings of fact and liability, 18
 defendant's counsel can
only reckon on the possibility of sweeping relief being entered simul-
taneously with a finding of liability without a further opportunity to
be heard.
Uncertainty as to the form which relief may take, with or with-
out a separate hearing, should be a strong factor in inducing a nego-
tiated settlement. It is of interest in this connection to delineate the
varieties of litigated injunctive relief, both to indicate the effect which
relief may have upon a defendant's business and to suggest some of
the more crucial areas in any settlement negotiations. Such a review
may also help to emphasize that if defendant decides not to settle a
See Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Wisc. 1958),
aff'd, 266 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1959).
311 A classic case is K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Service, 158
Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958), where defendants
were simply enjoined from making devices substantially the same as plaintiff's and
from "using in any way the confidential information obtained by defendants from an
examination of plaintiff's magnetic fishing tool." Although it seemed doubtful that any
trade secret was involved at all, the fact that the court was incensed with defendant's
conduct may have led to this question-begging injunction. See Arnold, Problems in
Trade Secret Law, in A.B.A. Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 248
(1961) .
17 See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 331-34 (1947); O'Donnell,
Civil Antitrust Trials, in A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, An Antitrust Handbook 301,
326-27 (1958).
18 E.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 143 U.S. Pat. Q. 172 (D. Conn. 1964).
748
TRADE SECRET LITIGATION
trade secret case, he may find himself virtually enjoined from carry-
ing on his business.
The first point involves the specificity with which the injunction
defines the processes whose use is forbidden. There does not seem
to be any uniform pattern, and courts may, in effect, simply enjoin
use of the "trade secrets found herein to have been misappropriated.'
Other courts require, however, that the secrets enjoined be specified,
such specification to be revealed only to the parties 2 0 Plaintiff has an
interest in defining in specific terms the trade secrets enjoined since
he will want made clear exactly what defendant cannot do; defendant,
on the other hand, will want to know clearly what he may do. This
shared interest may be more effectively promoted by settlement than
by having a judge who may not fully understand the technical ques-
tions involved hand down the injunction. Such a judge might, in a
fit of despair, enter an injunction which really avoids those technical
questions at the price of leaving both parties in the dark regarding
its meaning.
Another crucial issue relative to relief concerns the public domain
argument so beloved by defendants.' Whereas the client may have
rather exaggerated ideas of the value of his "secrets" when called upon
to disclose them in the course of litigation, when it comes to his oppo-
nent's secrets the same client may be tempted to dismiss them as
simply "standard practice." In addition to discouraging such opti-
mism, counsel should point out that defendants seldom get very far
in technologically complex cases with the contention that everything
which was misappropriated could have been put together from public
sources." The net result of the injunction, therefore, may be to pro-
hibit defendant from what the rest of the world may do with only a
moderate amount of effort and wit." The requirement of secrecy has,
10 See, e.g., K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Service, supra
note 16; Arnold, supra note 16.
20
 Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 Atl. 186 (1908). See
the injunction in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671,
192 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 960, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1962).
21 This public domain argument is obviously relevant to the issue of liability as
well as that of relief. It could be argued that a court should be more reluctant to
enjoin use of processes which could have been pieced together from information in the
public domain than to grant damages for their use in the form of a royalty, especially
where plaintiff has licensed others to use the same secrets. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F,2d
493 (2d Cir. 1953), stands, however, to the contrary.
22 see, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, supra note 21; Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d
369 (7th Cir. 1953); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., supra
note 20; Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306 (1958); Extrin Foods,
Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. .592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Fairchild Engine
& Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
23 The justification is that it would be impossible to ascertain whether defendant's
later improvements of his product were due to his independent experimentation or his
knowledge of plaintiff's secrets. Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 55 AU. 736 (1903);
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indeed, occasionally been reduced simply to a showing that defendant
did not know the "secret" before he learned it improperly from plain-
tiff, evidently regardless of whether the rest of the world did in fact
know it.' Moreover, even if many elements of the secret are in the
public domain, the total secret process may not be, and the injunction
may prohibit use of the total process, including elements in the public
domain."
In the course of settlement negotiations, however, defendant may
be able to salvage much that he otherwise would be enjoined from
using.
A litigated injunction may also extend to defendant's improve-
ments on processes he has been found to have misappropriated,2° as
well as processes which are "substantially similar." 27
 If defendant has
made important improvements he can, on the other hand, use the offer
of a license as a bargaining device in settlement negotiations, since
even if held liable, defendant may be permitted to patent those im-
provements found to have been due primarily to defendant's own
efforts.'
Another powerful inducement for defendant to settle is the possi-
bility that the court will enjoin him from manufacturing, regardless
of the process used, a product which he previously manufactured by
International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del. 1951),
aff'd, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. dismissed on stipulation, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
24
 See Berry v. Glidden Co., 92 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); McKinzie v. Cline,
197 Ore. 184, 252 P.2d 564 (1953); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co.,
210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4 (1904). In Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, 20 F.2d
386 (S.D.N.Y. 1927), A. Hand, J., suggested that if defendant obtained plaintiff's
process through improper means, he is estopped to assert that the process was not a
secret because embodied in the "prior art."
26 Sec Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, supra note 22; Heyden Chem. Corp. v. Burrell &
Neidig, Inc., 2 N.J. Super. 467, 64 A.2d 465 (1949). See cases cited in note 22, supra, for
holdings that it is irrelevant that the process could have been pieced together from
items in the public domain if that is not how, in fact, defendant learned of it. Compare
Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., supra note 9.
26 By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d
147 (1958); see Berry v. Glidden Co., supra note 24; Restatement, Torts 757,
comment c (1939).
27 Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, supra note 18; Harris Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 157
F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Ark. 1957); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp.,
supra note 23; Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420 (D. Md.
1946) (dictum), aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Ernst Slide Fastener Co. v.
Stamberg, 120 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, supra
note 22; L. M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1948). This
result has sometimes been explained in terms of the "doctrine of equivalents" which
originated in the field of patent law, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical
Tape Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 679, 235 N.Y.S.2d
830 (1962). That doctrine applies "where the process employed is used to produce an
identical result in ways directly suggested by the disclosure, though slightly differing
from it in detail." Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, supra note 24, at 387.
29 Ackermans v. General Motors Corp., 202 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 996 (1953); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958).
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means of plaintiff's secret process ?9
 One court seems to have suggested
that such injunctions violate the spirit of the antitrust laws by for-
bidding competition," and it is a matter of conjecture whether the
present Supreme Court would sustain them. In any case, this possi-
bility may have to be seriously considered in determining whether to
assume the risk of a litigated injunction.
These examples of the far-reaching forms of injunctive relief
could be multiplied. A sufficient number have, however, been provided
to suggest that in deciding whether to settle a trade secret case which
possibly might be lost if litigated, the defendant may be making one
of the most significant decisions of his business history. It is in giving
a hard-headed appraisal of the risks involved in this decision that
counsel to defendant can render as important a service as does plain-
tiff's counsel in the earlier stages of the litigation.
In short, the trade secret case calls for the best in any lawyer
as well as a wholehearted understanding of that lawyer's client—the
business executive involved. In most litigation the burden rests almost
entirely on the attorney's shoulders; here, however, he is lost without
the expertise of his client. His main effort must be to keep that expertise
objective.
29 Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., supra note 28; Franke v. Wiltschek, supra note
21; Sealectro Corp, v. Tefco Electronics, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 11, 223 N.Y,S,2d 235 (Sup.
Ct. 1961). See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., supra note 22.
30 By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., supra note 26.
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